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The Effects of Control and Uncertainty on Children’s Supernatural 
Beliefs 
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Most people believe that the world is orderly and predictable, and one mechanism 
by which this belief is maintained is a sense of personal control, or the belief that one can 
predict and steer outcomes. Research indicates that when adults perceive a threat to their 
personal control, they will compensate for this threat by seeking other sources of control. 
However, it is unclear whether children also feel threatened by a lack of personal control 
or whether they seek similar sources of compensatory control as adults. The proposed 
studies investigated the process of compensatory control in children. A novel game 
primed children to feel either high personal control or low personal control in order to 
evaluate the extent to which children seek compensatory control via 1) the detection of 
visual patterns in random noise, 2) endorsement of superstitious explanations for events, 
and 3) explicit belief in supernatural sources of control. Children also completed a 
questionnaire designed to measure their intolerance of uncertainty. It was predicted that 
both the manipulation of control and individual differences in children’s willingness to 
tolerate uncertainty would affect compensatory control seeking behaviors. Results 
indicated that manipulation of personal control did not affect children’s pattern detection; 
vii 
however, the manipulation did affect children’s endorsement of karma-like explanations, 
such that children in the low-control condition were significantly more likely to endorse 
such explanations compared to children in the high-control condition. Regarding 
individual differences, results indicated a positive relationship between children’s 
intolerance of uncertainty and their explicit belief in God. These results are interpreted 
with regard to existing research with adults, and the implications for situational and 
dispositional motivations for control are discussed.  
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Introduction 
“As nature abhors a vacuum, so does human nature abhor randomness. We prefer 
order over chaos, harmony over cacophony, and religion over the prospect of an arbitrary 
world.” – Vyse, 1997 
 
A basic human motivation is to understand, predict, and maintain a sense of 
control over our environment. However, sometimes we encounter events that threaten our 
sense of control, and we experience such events as psychologically aversive. Research 
indicates that when adults perceive a threat to their personal control, they are motivated 
to seek external sources of control in order to compensate (Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & 
Galinsky, 2009). Like personal control, these sources of compensatory control serve to 
preserve a sense of order and avoid the anxiety associated with the possibility that life’s 
events are subject to randomness and thus outside the realm of personal control. 
Examples of compensatory control-seeking behaviors include detecting patterns in 
random stimuli (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), engaging in ritualistic or superstitious 
behavior (Keinan, 2002), and believing in nonmaterial sources of control, such as God 
(Laurin, Kay, & Moscovitch, 2008). According to the model of compensatory control 
(Kay et al., 2009), these various behaviors help maintain a belief in a nonrandom world, 
or a belief that things are generally in control even in the absence of personal control. 
This dissertation is an investigation of the development of the compensatory 
control process in children. Specifically, it addresses whether children perceive a lack of 
control as threatening and whether a lack of control motivates them to seek similar 
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sources of compensatory control as adults. In the literature review, I first define personal 
control, describe why a lack of control is psychologically aversive, and summarize 
research that reveals our misconceptions about personal control and randomness. Then, I 
review evidence that supports our motivation to seek sources of compensatory control 
when our personal control is threatened and present findings that indicate that individuals 
differ in the extent to which they are motivated to seek control. Next, I provide the details 
of my experiments, including the methodology used to assess the effects of lack of 
control and uncertainty tolerance on children’s use of compensatory control. Following 
each experiment, I present the results and discuss the findings. The final chapter serves as 
a general discussion. 
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Literature Review 
PERSONAL CONTROL 
A useful place to begin is with a description of personal control and the function it 
serves. Kay et al. (2009) define personal control as “an individual’s belief that he or she 
can personally predict, affect, and steer events in the present and future” (p.264). 
According to these researchers, personal control is one mechanism by which we reduce 
uncertainty and maintain the view that the world is orderly and predictable. In other 
words, personal control is not an end in itself; rather it is a means of preserving the belief 
that the world is not random. 
Effects of Having and Lacking Personal Control 
A long history of theoretical and empirical research demonstrates that control 
plays a crucial role in human psychology. Not only are we are motivated to maintain 
control throughout the lifespan (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995), but a sense of control has 
been associated with better physical health (Shapiro & Astin, 1998), more self-efficacy 
(Bandura, 1977), and adaptive adjustment to adversity (Taylor & Armor, 2006). On the 
other hand, feeling a lack of control can result in hopelessness and depression (Prociuk, 
Breen, & Lussier, 1976), stress and anxiety (Moulding & Kyrios, 2006), as well as fear 
(Mineka & Kelly, 1989).  
One of the most striking examples of the effect of personal control on 
psychological wellbeing comes from a field study conducted in 1976 by Langer and 
Rodin. As part of an intervention, elderly residents in an experimental group listened to a 
speech that emphasized their personal responsibility, whereas residents in a control group 
listened to a speech that emphasized the staff’s responsibility toward the residents. Also, 
the experimental group was given the choice to take care of a houseplant, while residents 
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in the control group had their plants maintained by the staff. After only three weeks, 
results indicated that the experimental group scored higher on measures of alertness, 
active participation, positive mood, and sociability. Moreover, a follow-up study 
conducted 18 months later revealed that those who were given more personal control 
were not only healthier than they were before the intervention, but they were also more 
likely to be alive compared to those in the control condition (Rodin & Langer, 1977). 
If the function of personal control is to help us feel that we can predict and 
understand our world, it is easy to see why we are motivated to believe that the world is 
not random. After all, the word random is typically defined as “having no definite aim or 
purpose; haphazard” (Oxford English Dictionary). Interestingly, research suggests that 
we not only perceive randomness as a threat to our personal control, but we also have 
various misconceptions about the nature of randomness and our ability to predict it. The 
following sections describe children’s and adult’s understanding of randomness.  
Children’s Understanding of Randomness 
Piaget and Inhelder (1975) were the first to systematically investigate children’s 
understanding of chance and randomness. In their study, children aged 4 to 12 years were 
shown a shallow box that rested on a pivot point (similar to a seesaw), and along the 
width of the box were eight red marbles followed by eight white marbles. Children were 
asked to predict the movement of the marbles as the box moved from one side to the 
other, and these predictions were used to categorize children into one of three stages. 
Children aged 4 to 7 were typically categorized in the first stage of chance understanding. 
These children often referred to an underlying order or uniformity, and their predictions 
about future movements of the marbles relied on past observations. Not until stage two, 
between the ages of 7 and 11, did children begin to formulate the idea of chance, as 
 5 
measured by their understanding of the impossibility of foreseeing future random events. 
When children fully demonstrated comprehension of randomness, usually between the 
ages of 11 and 12 years, they were said to be in the final stage of understanding. Not only 
did the predictions of this age group reflect an understanding of the random nature of 
marbles’ movements, but Piaget and Inhelder also concluded that children in this stage 
understand that increased repetitions will lead to a more stable distribution of outcomes, 
known as the law of large numbers. 
However, more recent research suggests that even older children’s understanding 
of randomness has its shortcomings. For example, a study by Metz (1998) demonstrated 
that third graders (8- and 9-year-olds) are susceptible to attributing determinacy to an 
apparatus that produces random outcomes. In one task, kindergarteners and third graders 
played a board game that entailed flicking a spinner that could land on one of four colors 
taking up various areas of the spinner. Older children differed from younger children in 
their understanding that the outcomes were proportional to the relative area of the colors 
on the spinner; however, children of both age groups failed to appreciate the 
indeterminacy of each spin and the uncertainty that should accompany indeterminacy.  
This suggests that Piaget may have overestimated older children’s understanding of 
randomness.  
Understanding the independence of random events is especially difficult for 
children when they are asked to make predictions in the face of past outcomes. For 
example, Ridgway and Ridgway (2010) engaged children aged 6 to 12 years in a task that 
involved estimating the outcomes of coin flips. On the first trial, children were asked to 
consider a coin flip and report whether heads was more likely, whether tails was more 
likely, or whether the outcomes were equally likely. On subsequent trials, participants 
were asked to consider a series of outcomes (e.g., heads, tails, heads, tails) and then 
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report whether heads was more likely to appear next, whether tails was more likely, or 
whether the outcomes were equally likely. Results indicated that among those who 
acknowledged that the two outcomes had an equal probability in the case of the single 
coin flip, nearly 50% of those children failed to generalize this reasoning to other trials in 
which a pattern of outcomes had first been established. Thus, it seems that children as old 
as 12 years continue to struggle with the concept of randomness, especially when asked 
to make predictions. 
Research also indicates that children exhibit what Langer (1975) coined as an 
“illusion of control,” or the notion that personal attributes can affect chance outcomes. In 
one study (Weisz, 1980), 5- to 6-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds predicted the success of 
various pairs of children participating in a game in which they attempted to draw cards 
with yellow dots from a deck said to contain both blue- and yellow-dotted cards. 
Compared to older children, younger children were more likely to predict greater success 
for a smart child and for a child who was allowed to practice. However, a significant 
proportion of both younger and older children responded that a child who was careful and 
tried hard would be more successful than a child who did not try very hard. That is to say, 
all children erroneously attributed the success of drawing the yellow cards as contingent 
upon the effort of doing so. 
Recent work by Cornelius and Woolley (2014) indicates that children’s success in 
a game of chance also breeds an illusion of control. Children ages 5 and 8 played a 
guessing game that involved dropping a marble into the top of a box and predicting from 
which of two doors at the bottom of the box the marble would exit. Unbeknownst to the 
participants, the experimenter controlled the marble’s movements to ensure that some 
participants experienced success and others experienced failure. For each trial, 
participants were asked to provide an explanation for their prediction and rate their level 
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of certainty that their prediction would be correct. Children exhibited an illusion of 
control in their explanations, such as stating that they knew how to drop the marble in a 
particular way to make it exit the predicted door. They also revealed their illusory sense 
of control in their certainty ratings. Specifically, as the game progressed, children who 
experienced more success became more confident in their ability to make correct 
predictions. This behavior illustrates a misconception known as “hot hand,” or the belief 
that success increases the likelihood of future success. 
In sum, children begin to demonstrate a nascent understanding of randomness 
between the ages of 7 and 12; nonetheless, children in this age group continue to exhibit 
misconceptions about the extent to which they can control and accurately predict random 
outcomes. As the next section will illustrate, adults have similar misconceptions. 
Adults’ Understanding of Randomness 
Research with adults suggests that fully understanding how randomness operates 
may not be a developmental milestone after all. For example, research by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1971) reveals that even professional psychologists hold misconceptions 
about probability, such as the erroneous assumption that random samples should 
resemble the underlying population, known as belief in the law of small numbers. This 
erroneous belief that small, random samples should resemble the underlying population is 
thought to be the cause of the well-documented gambler’s fallacy, as demonstrated when 
someone predicts that a coin flip is more likely to come up tails after witnessing three 
heads in a row (Croson & Sundali, 2005). Such a prediction is inaccurate because the 
outcomes of coin flips are independent and identically distributed, such that the 
probability of tails is no more or no less than .50 on any given trial, regardless of whether 
the previous trials have been heads.  
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The gambler’s fallacy has also been documented in adults outside the laboratory. 
For example, empirical data from casinos reveals that players of roulette demonstrate the 
gambler’s fallacy when they place a bet for red after observing the roulette wheel 
consecutively land on black for five or more trials. In lottery games, the gambler’s fallacy 
is observed when players bet less money on those numbers that were winning numbers in 
the previous drawing (Terrell, 1994). 
Adults also exhibit fallacies with regard to the perceived effects of personal 
attributes on chance outcomes. Langer (1975) identified factors specific to skill-related 
tasks which, when incorporated into chance-determined tasks, produce an illusion of 
control. In a series of studies involving chance games (e.g., lottery and drawing cards), 
Langer found that adults’ confidence in winning a chance game changed as a function of 
their familiarity with the stimulus, amount of practice, choice, and active involvement, 
which led her to conclude that although “people may pay lip service to the concept of 
chance, they behave as though chance events are subject to control” (p.311). The 
following section will address other ways in which we behave as though events are 
subject to control.  
COMPENSATORY CONTROL 
The previous section demonstrated how children and adults misinterpret random 
events as being subject to personal control. When an event cannot be interpreted as 
subject to personal control, the resulting unpredictability is unsettling, and people are 
motivated to compensate for this lack of personal control by engaging in behaviors that 
help maintain the belief that the world is predictable rather than random. In their proposal 
of this compensatory control process, Kay et al. (2009) suggest a few behaviors that may 
serve the function of acquiring compensatory control. One source of compensatory 
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control is the perception of illusory patterns. As defined by Whitson and Galinsky (2008), 
illusory pattern perception entails “the identification of a coherent and meaningful 
interrelationship among a set of random or unrelated stimuli” (p.115). In this sense, 
illusory pattern perception can refer to a variety of phenomena, such as visually detecting 
objects in random noise, as well as inferring that some behavior or object is causally 
related to an event. Another way that people compensate for a lack of personal control is 
by affirming their belief in nonmaterial sources of control, such as God (Kay et al., 
2009). The following sections highlight research that demonstrates how threats to 
personal control are associated with visual pattern perception, endorsement of 
superstition, and explicit belief in nonmaterial sources of control.  
Visual Pattern Perception: Findings with Adults 
Although there are no developmental studies that directly assess the effect of lack 
of control on basic pattern perception, research indicates that children as young as 4 years 
can learn how to detect patterns (Papic, Mulligan, & Mitchelmore, 2011). For instance, 
after a 6-month intervention aimed to teach preschoolers about spatial patterns, results 
indicated that children in the experimental group demonstrated a greater understanding of 
what constituted a “unit of repeat,” as measured by their superior ability to extend 
patterns compared to a control group. Moreover, mathematics curricula during the early 
school years maintain that children’s ability to recognize visual patterns in the 
environment is an important precursor to algebraic thinking (McGarvey, 2012). 
Indirect evidence from Cornelius and Woolley (2014) suggests that priming 
children to feel a lack of control can increase the perception of patterned outcomes. 
During the aforementioned game in which children predicted the movement of a marble 
through a box, children who experienced a lack of control in the form of incorrect 
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predictions were more likely to spontaneously generate hypotheses about how the 
outcomes were patterned. For example, upon observing the marble exit the right door on 
the first trial and the left door on the second trial, one child predicted that the marble 
would continue exiting the doors in an alternating fashion. However, after observing the 
marble exit the left door on the third trial, the child concluded that the box must follow a 
“right, left, left” pattern instead. Interestingly, many children continued to maintain that 
the outcomes were patterned, even after having up to four of their predicted patterns 
disconfirmed. Unlike the successful children who exhibited an illusion of personal 
control, unsuccessful children were motivated to determine an underlying order to the 
marble’s random movements and hence “detected” patterns that were not really present. 
Visual Pattern Perception: Findings with Children 
Although there are no developmental studies that directly assess the effect of lack 
of control on basic pattern perception, research indicates that children as young as 4 years 
can learn how to detect patterns (Papic, Mulligan, & Mitchelmore, 2011). For instance, 
after a 6-month intervention aimed to teach preschoolers about spatial patterns, results 
indicated that children in the experimental group demonstrated a greater understanding of 
what constituted a “unit of repeat,” as measured by their superior ability to extend 
patterns compared to a control group. Moreover, mathematics curricula during the early 
school years maintain that children’s ability to recognize visual patterns in the 
environment is an important precursor to algebraic thinking (McGarvey, 2012). 
Indirect evidence from Cornelius and Woolley (2014) suggests that priming 
children to feel a lack of control can increase the perception of patterned outcomes. 
During the aforementioned game in which children predicted the movement of a marble 
through a box, children who experienced a lack of control in the form of incorrect 
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predictions were more likely to spontaneously generate hypotheses about how the 
outcomes were patterned. For example, upon observing the marble exit the right door on 
the first trial and the left door on the second trial, one child predicted that the marble 
would continue exiting the doors in an alternating fashion. However, after observing the 
marble exit the left door on the third trial, the child concluded that the box must follow a 
“right, left, left” pattern instead. Interestingly, many children continued to maintain that 
the outcomes were patterned, even after having up to four of their predicted patterns 
disconfirmed. Unlike the successful children who exhibited an illusion of personal 
control, unsuccessful children were motivated to determine an underlying order to the 
marble’s random movements and hence “detected” patterns that were not really present. 
Endorsement of Superstition: Findings with Adults 
Superstition can include a wide variety of behaviors, but behind all superstitious 
behavior is an unjustified belief in causation. Levinson (1963) defined superstition as any 
belief that “indicates as ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ pairs of events between which is seriously 
insufficient logical linkage.” Thus, superstition can include the belief that a particular 
action can cause an event (e.g., crossing one’s fingers), and the belief that an object can 
bring good fortune (e.g., a four-leafed clover). Superstitious belief is surprisingly 
prevalent among the general population (Vyse, 1997). For example, 63% of American 
adults report having at least one superstition, and 72% say they have at least one good 
luck charm (Epstein, 1993).  
One contextual factor that is related to superstition is the need for control in times 
of uncertainty. In one study, Whitson and Galinsky (2008) demonstrated that priming 
participants with either high personal control or low personal control affected their 
judgments about the efficacy of superstitious behaviors. Half of participants were 
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instructed to recall an autobiographical experience when they had control over a 
situation, while the other half recalled an experience when they lacked control. Then 
participants read vignettes in which the main character experienced an event that was 
preceded by a potentially irrelevant behavior (e.g., a businessman getting ignored at a 
meeting after failing to stomp his feet three times before walking in the door). 
Participants rated the extent to which they perceived the action to be connected to the 
event. Results indicated that participants in the low-control condition perceived a greater 
degree of connection between the character’s action and the event compared to 
participants in the high-control condition, and they also reported more motivation to 
perform the superstitious behaviors themselves in the future. This illustrates how a need 
for personal control can motivate superstitious behavior.  
Legare and Souza (2014) have also demonstrated that priming randomness 
increases the perceived efficacy of superstitious behavior. For these studies, researchers 
created various rituals, defined as “causally opaque procedures,” and paired these rituals 
with specific ailments. These novel superstitions were said to be remedies for unwanted 
conditions. As an example, one ritual read, “For five days, the person with depression 
should go to a crossroad. While there, the person should say, ‘Depression, stay here!’ The 
person should not walk through the crossroad for one year.” Using a scramble sentence 
task in which participants are given a list of words and asked to make a sentence, half of 
the participants were primed with words relating to randomness (e.g., haphazardly, 
chance) and half of the participants were primed with negative words (e.g., slimy, 
idiotic). Results indicated that participants who received the randomness prime rated the 
superstitious behaviors as more effective than those who did not receive the randomness 
prime. The authors conclude that superstitious behavior serves to maintain an illusion of 
control and increase one’s sense of predictability, especially in times of uncertainty. 
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Moreover, these results support the notion that priming randomness can activate biases to 
link two actions or events that are not causally related. 
Endorsement of Superstition: Findings with Children  
Piaget (1929) was the first to describe children’s superstitious beliefs. He used the 
term “magic by participation” to refer to children’s belief in a causal relationship between 
unrelated people, objects, or events. For example, the belief that some action could bring 
about a positive or negative event was referred to as “magic by participation between 
actions and things.” Piaget believed that this form of magical thinking occurred because 
children confused the action for the actual cause of the event, and he maintained that 
beliefs in magical causation decreased with age, as children became increasingly more 
logical in their thinking.    
In their book, The Lore and Language of School Children, Opie and Opie (1959) 
documented a comprehensive collection of childhood rituals and superstitions. Some 
examples included superstitious sayings (e.g., “step on a crack, you’ll break your 
mother’s back”), ideas about how to improve the efficacy of wishing (e.g., one must blow 
all the birthday candles out in one breath in order for the wish to come true), considering 
simultaneous speech by two people to be a jinx, and the belief that seeing a rare object 
could bring good fortune. Children also reported the use of good luck charms as a way to 
improve their performance in school and in games. 
Other evidence that children will engage in superstitious behavior comes from 
early research designed to replicate Skinner’s original work (1948) that suggested 
superstitions arise from operant conditioning. In one study, Wagner and Morris (1987) 
invited 3- to 6-year-olds to play a game with a toy clown, Bobo, that dispensed marbles 
that the children could later trade in for a highly desired toy. Bobo was programmed to 
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dispense the marbles on a fixed schedule, but over the course of six, eight-minute 
sessions, 75% of children developed sequences of behaviors that they performed 
repetitively, as if they believed their actions caused Bobo to dispense the marbles.  
Only recently have researchers replicated the finding that children will engage in 
superstitious behavior in a lab setting (Sheehan, VanReet, & Bloom, 2012). In this study, 
a sensory superstition paradigm was used that involved the display of icons on a touch 
screen monitor. Children aged 3 to 5 first completed practice trials in which their taps on 
the screen were reinforced with a smiley face icon. Next, children were told that 
sometimes they needed to tap the screen many times to make the smiley face appear. On 
half of the test trials, a butterfly icon was displayed that had no relation to children’s taps 
or to the display of the smiley face. Results indicated that children’s rate of tapping was 
greater when the butterfly was displayed versus when no stimulus was displayed, 
suggesting that children associated the presentation of the butterfly with an upcoming 
presentation of the smiley face, even though the two icons were unrelated. Interestingly, 
no age differences were found, indicating that 3-year-olds were just as likely as 5-year-
olds to engage in this form of superstitious behavior.  
Although the traditional view in developmental psychology for a long time was 
that children were more prone to magical thinking than adults, recent evidence suggests 
that children may in fact be less likely to endorse beliefs in supernatural causation than 
adults. In one study, Legare and Gelman (2008) examined bewitchment beliefs among 
children and adults in Sesotho-speaking South African communities. Participants first 
listened to vignettes that described a person who was diagnosed with AIDS and then 
rated the extent to which they agreed with a variety of explanations, such as “Lerato has 
been bewitched by a neighbor who was jealous of her” and “Lerato used a razor with 
someone else’s sick blood on it.” Results indicated that children preferred biological 
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explanations to bewitchment explanations, whereas adults considered these two types of 
explanations as equally effective. Research in the U.S. has also found that adults are more 
likely than children to spontaneously provide a supernatural explanation, especially for 
low-probability events (Woolley, Cornelius, & Lacey, 2011). With regard to superstition 
specifically, survey data indicate that adults are more superstitious than children. 
Specifically, 46% of children between the ages of 9 and 12 report having at least one 
superstition compared to 63% of adults, and 45% of children say they have at least one 
good luck charm compared to 72% of adults (Epstein, 1993). Given these data, we might 
expect that appeals to superstition as a source of compensatory control will increase with 
age. 
Belief in Nonmaterial Sources of Control: Findings with Adults 
Among the other possible sources of control to which one might appeal in times 
of uncertainty, perhaps an omnipotent God is the most common. A recent study by Kay 
and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that priming adults to feel a lack of control increases 
belief in the existence of a controlling God. Using an autobiographical recall task, half of 
the participants were told to recall a time when they had absolute control and half of the 
participants were told to recall a time when they had absolutely no control. Next, 
participants rated the extent to which they believed in God. However, for half of the 
participants, God was described as a source of control (e.g., “To what extent do you think 
that God is in control of the universe?”), and for the other half of participants God was 
described as a creator (e.g., “To what extent do you think that God created the 
universe?”). Results revealed a significant interaction, such that only when God was 
described as a source of control did the manipulation of personal control have an effect 
on belief.  
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Other work demonstrates that it is specifically the anxiety associated with 
randomness that drives belief in a controlling God (Kay, Moscovitch, & Laurin, 2010). 
Adult participants ingested an herbal supplement, and half of the participants were told 
that a common side effect of the pill was mild anxiety or arousal. In reality, everyone was 
given a placebo pill. Participants then completed a priming task that entailed either 
unscrambling words that pertained to randomness or unscrambling negative words. 
Finally, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with various 
statements designed to measure their belief in a controlling God. Results revealed a 
significant interaction, such that participants who were primed to think of randomness 
and were told nothing about the side effect of the pill were most likely to believe in 
supernatural sources of control. There was no effect of the randomness prime for those 
participants who were told that the pill could cause arousal, suggesting that any anxiety 
participants experienced as a result of thinking about randomness was attributed to the 
pill’s alleged side effect. These results highlight both the disquiet we experience from 
randomness and the tendency to appeal to God as a source of control when our personal 
control is threatened. 
While God may be the most prototypical example of an external source of control, 
there is evidence that adults often appeal to other nonmaterial concepts as explanations 
for unpredictable events. For example, Pepitone and Saffioti (1997) presented adults with 
events that were designed to be difficult to explain (i.e., the outcome was unexpected and 
seemed to “just happen”), and asked participants for spontaneous explanations. As an 
example of a difficult-to-explain event, one vignette described a man who was reunited 
with his long-lost brother while on vacation in a remote area. Pepitone and Saffioti found 
that adults appeal to a host of nonmaterial concepts to explain these events, including just 
reward, just punishment, luck, and fate. 
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Belief in Nonmaterial Sources of Control: Findings with Children  
Research by Woolley et al. (2011) addressed whether children also appeal to God 
and other nonmaterial sources of control in the service of explanation. Children between 
the ages of 8 and 12 years listened to vignettes describing difficult-to-explain events and 
provided their spontaneous explanations. These researchers found that while 8 and 10 
year-olds were less likely to appeal to supernatural forces compared to adults, the 12-
year-old participants did not differ from adults in their use of supernatural explanations. 
Analysis of the specific types of explanations revealed that while all age groups appealed 
to luck and karma-like explanations with equal frequency, 12-year-olds were the most 
likely to endorse God as a source of control. These results suggest developmental 
differences in the specific nonmaterial sources of compensatory control to which children 
might appeal.  
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN NEED FOR CONTROL 
The previous sections provided evidence that people are motivated to seek 
compensatory control when randomness threatens their personal control. However, there 
is also evidence that individuals may differ in the extent to which they feel threatened by 
randomness, unpredictability, or lack of personal control. Furthermore, these individual 
differences may interact with situational factors to affect compensatory control-seeking 
behaviors.  
For example, Keinan (1994) examined the relationships between stress, tolerance 
of ambiguity, and superstitious behavior. Participants included Israeli adults who either 
lived in cities that were prone to missile attacks during the Gulf War (a high-stress 
environment) or cities that were not prone to missile attacks (a low-stress environment). 
All participants completed an assessment of ambiguity tolerance to assess individual 
differences in the perception of uncertain situations as threatening. Participants also rated 
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how much they with agreed various forms of superstition (e.g., “It is best to step into the 
room right foot first” and  “It’s a good idea to keep a good luck charm in the house”). 
Results indicated a significant interaction between stress and ambiguity tolerance, such 
that those participants who were the least tolerant of ambiguity and also living in cities 
prone to missile attacks were the most likely to endorse superstitious behaviors. Keinan 
concluded that individuals who are low in ambiguity tolerance are especially prone to 
superstition in stressful contexts because such contexts often involve a high degree of 
unpredictability and uncertainty.  
Similar effects of stress and need for control have been replicated in a lab setting. 
In one study (Keinan, 2002), participants were seated at a wooden table for an interview, 
and some of the questions asked were designed to induce a common superstitious 
behavior, knocking on wood (e.g., “Have you ever been involved in a fatal car 
accident?”). Half of the participants were asked these questions prior to taking a very 
important exam (high-stress condition), while the other half of participants were asked 
these questions on an ordinary day (low-stress condition). Participants also rated their 
level of agreement with statements that measured individual differences in motivation to 
control one’s environment. Again, results revealed a significant interaction between stress 
and motivation to maintain control, such that among participants in the high stress 
environment, individuals with the strongest desire for control were the most likely to 
knock on wood. This illustrates how both situational and dispositional factors affect one’s 
superstitious tendencies. 
Individuals also differ in the degree to which they become anxious as a result of 
lacking control, and these differences affect belief in nonmaterial sources of control. 
Laurin et al. (2008) guided adult participants through a frightening scenario that either 
ended favorably due to the participant’s own actions (high personal control condition) or 
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due to the help of somebody else (low personal control condition). For example, 
participants were asked to vividly imagine that a man was chasing them with a knife, and 
the situation either ended with participants saving themselves by making a phone call to 
the police (high personal control condition) or with the police suddenly intercepting the 
offender (low personal control condition). After this task, participants reported their 
subjective levels of anxiety on a 100-point scale as well as their belief in nonmaterial 
sources of control (e.g., “God or some other nonhuman entity”). Analyses revealed a 
significant interaction between the control manipulation and self-reported anxiety, such 
that only in the low-control condition did anxiety have an effect on belief. In other words, 
participants who had their personal control threatened and reported feeling anxious 
because of it were most likely to endorse belief in other sources of control. This study 
emphasizes the role of anxiety in the compensatory control process. 
Although no research exists on individual differences in children’s motivations to 
seek compensatory control, there is evidence that children differ in their tolerance of 
uncertainty (Comer et al., 2009). Intolerance of uncertainty is considered a dispositional 
trait that characterizes the tendency to react negatively on an emotional, cognitive, or 
behavioral level to uncertain situations and events. Comer and colleagues (2009) recently 
developed The Intolerance for Uncertainty Scale for Children, which consists of 27 
statements that express aversion to various forms of uncertainty.  Participants are asked to 
rate on a 5-point scale the extent to which they agree with each statement. Upon 
administering the scale to 197 children between the ages of 7 and 17, Comer et al. found 
that there were no sex differences in intolerance of uncertainty; however, intolerance of 
uncertainty appeared to vary with age. Specifically, these researchers reported that 
younger children had more difficulty tolerating uncertainty than older children. The 
researchers speculated that perhaps normative development consists of an increased 
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ability to tolerate uncertain events. This finding leads to interesting predictions about how 
children of different ages cope with uncertainty and lack of control. On the one hand, 
younger children may be more motivated than older children to seek sources of control 
given their greater discomfort with uncertainty. However, it could also be the case that 
older children are better able to tolerate uncertain situations because they have already 
learned alternative means of maintaining a sense of control. 
SUMMARY AND STUDY OVERVIEW 
The world in which we live is undoubtedly chaotic, yet people tend to shy away 
from this harsh reality and instead maintain the belief that the world is orderly and 
predictable. One way that this worldview is maintained is via personal control, or one’s 
belief in his or her ability to personally affect or predict events. However, when random 
or otherwise unpredictable events threaten personal control, adults will turn to alternative 
sources of control in order to maintain the belief that events do not happen arbitrarily.   
It is unclear whether children also perceive a lack of control as threatening. It 
seems that in order to feel threatened by randomness, one must first be able to identify it. 
Given younger children’s less sophisticated understanding of what constitutes a random 
event, they may be less inclined to seek compensatory control when faced with a 
seemingly random event simply because they do not sense a threat to their personal 
control. Even if younger children are able to detect randomness and experience it as 
threatening, it is likely that the availability of particular sources of compensatory control 
develops as children become increasingly socialized to the specific customs and beliefs of 
their society. If this is the case, we might expect children of all ages to seek comfort in 
the most basic form of compensatory control, pattern detection, but endorsing specific 
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superstitious behaviors and expressing explicit belief in nonmaterial sources of control 
might not occur until later in development. 
The current studies investigated the process of compensatory control in children. 
The first study had 2 objectives: 1) to test the efficacy of a novel personal control 
manipulation, and 2) measure the effects of age, lack of control, and intolerance of 
uncertainty on the most basic of the compensatory control processes, namely visual 
detection of patterns in random noise. The objective of the second study was to use the 
novel personal control manipulation to further investigate the effects of age, lack of 
control, and intolerance of uncertainty on the motivation to seek other sources of 
compensatory control, including the endorsement of superstitious behavior and belief in 
supernatural sources of control. 
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Method of Study 1 
PARTICIPANTS 
Participants for Study 1 were 53 children (28 female), ranging in age from 6 to 12 
years. One participant was excluded from analysis after his parents notified the 
experimenter that he had been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder. Of the 52 
participants included for analysis, there were 3 6-year-olds (M = 82.10 months), 11 7-
year-olds (M = 91.64 months), 10 8-year-olds (M = 104.26 months), 8 9-year-olds (M = 
117.55 months), 8 10-year-olds (M = 126.65 months), 10 11-year-olds (M = 141.42 
months), and 2 12-year-olds (M = 152.25 months). Sixty-seven percent of the participants 
were Caucasian, 11.5% were Hispanic or Latino, 8% were Asian, and 13.5% were more 
than one race. The majority of participants (85%) were recruited from the Children’s 
Research Laboratory database, and some participants (15%) were recruited from a local 
recreational center. 
MATERIALS 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
The purpose of this scale was to measure individual differences in children’s 
willingness to tolerate uncertainty. The scale consisted of 10 items that were developed 
by modifying items from the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale for Children (Comer et al., 
2009). The original items were modified to 1) decrease the total amount of time required 
to administer the scale, and 2) reduce the complexity of the vocabulary and sentence 
structure of the items. For example, Comer et al.’s items, “Plans can be ruined by things 
you didn’t think would happen” and “One should always think ahead to avoid surprises” 
were modified in the current study with the item,  “I always think ahead so that I don’t 
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get surprised” (see Appendix A). The 10 items used for this study always appeared in the 
same order. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with each 
item using a 5-point scale, ranging from “not at all” (0) to “all the way” (4). Two of the 
10 items expressed a tolerance of uncertainty and were reverse-scored. A laminated 
version of the 5-point scale was available for participants to indicate their responses. 
Plinko Computer Game 
The purpose of this game was to prime children to feel either high personal 
control or low personal control as a result of perceived randomness. The game consisted 
of a pegboard with five slots at the top and five bins at the bottom. The objective of the 
game was to correctly predict which of the bins a ball would land in after it was dropped 
from one of the slots at the top of the pegboard (see Appendix B for screenshots). 
Participants used the mouse to indicate their predicted bin, and then they chose a slot at 
the top from which to drop the ball. The game was created to result in one of two possible 
scenarios: 1) the participant guessed the correct bin on 8 of the 10 trials (high-control 
condition), or 2) the participant guessed the incorrect bin 8 of the 10 trials (low-control 
condition). In the high-control condition, participants were incorrect on trials 4 and 7; the 
low-control condition, participants were correct on trials 4 and 7. 
Object Detection Task 
This task was a modified version of a task used by Whitson and Galinsky (2008), 
which entailed presenting participants with images of white noise (i.e., randomly 
distributed black and white pixels) and asking them to report whether they see an object 
in the image. In studies with adults (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), participants viewed the 
stimuli on paper and wrote their responses on a response form. In order to increase 
engagement for children and to reduce the demands required to print words, the stimuli 
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used for the current study were pasted into a PowerPoint presentation, and each image 
was displayed on the computer screen for 2 seconds. Participants verbally reported what 
object, if any, they detected in the images. Two of the images (image 3 and image 7) had 
a shape embedded in the noise (see Appendix C). The order of presentation was the same 
for all participants.  
PROCEDURE 
Participants were seen on an individual basis. Upon obtainment of informed 
consent and assent, participants sat at a table, and the researcher outlined the tasks of the 
experiment. The researcher explained that first she was going to read some sentences and 
ask the children how much they agreed with each sentence using the 5-point scale. The 
experimenter pointed to each of the 5 response options on the laminated scale, and 
children were told they could either state their response or point to it on the scale. 
Children then practiced using the scale for 3 items. Each practice item expressed an 
opinion (e.g., “I think that vegetables taste better than fruit”), and participants indicated 
how much they agreed with each item (see Appendix D for script). No feedback was 
given for children’s responses to these practice items. Before moving on to the 
intolerance of uncertainty items, the experimenter emphasized that there were no right or 
wrong answers, and participants were encouraged to answer in a manner that best 
reflected their thoughts. Then the experimenter read each of the 10 items from the 
intolerance of uncertainty scale, and participants indicated their level of agreement with 
each statement. 
Next, the experimenter directed children’s attention to the computer screen and 
introduced the Plinko game by saying, “See this pegboard? In a minute, you’re going to 
drop a ball from one of these slots at the top of the board. But first, I want you to make a 
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guess about where you think the ball will land. To make your guess, you’ll click on one 
of these blue arrows at the bottom (experimenter points to bins at the bottom of the 
pegboard). Then, after you make your guess, you’ll click on one of these purple arrows at 
the top to drop the ball (experimenter points to slots at the top of the pegboard). We’ll 
watch the ball go down the pegboard and see if it lands in the bin that you guessed. The 
goal of this game is to get as many guesses right as you can, and you’ll get 10 tries.  Does 
that make sense? Are you ready?” Children then took control of the mouse and completed 
all 10 trials of the version of the game to which they had been randomly assigned (i.e., 
high control or low control). 
After playing Plinko, participants were asked a series of questions designed to 
measure whether the game successfully manipulated their perceived control. First, 
participants answered an open-ended question about their thoughts on the game (“So, 
that’s the end of the game; what did you think about it?”). Second, children were asked to 
indicate how much they believed they were in control of what happened in the game on a 
5-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “all the way” (“Tell me, how much do you think 
you were in control of what happened in that game?”). Third, children predicted how 
many guesses they would get right if they were to play the game again, using a 5-point 
scale ranging from “none of the times” to “all of the times” (“If we were to play that 
game again, how many times do you think you would get your guesses right?”). Fourth, 
children indicated their negative affect on a 5-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “all 
the way” (“How upset or bothered are you?”). Finally, the experimenter invited children 
to share any other thoughts they had about the game before proceeding to the final task of 
the experiment (“Do you have anything else you would like to tell me about the game 
before we move on to something else?”).  
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The researcher then introduced the object detection task by saying, “Now we are 
going to do a test to see how good you are at seeing things quickly. I’m going to show 
you some pictures, and I want you to tell me as fast as you can what things you see. Here 
is an example of what the pictures will look like.” An example image of white noise was 
displayed on the screen for 2 seconds and then disappeared. The experimenter proceeded 
by saying, “Now, some of the pictures might not have something in them. So, if you 
don’t see anything, that’s okay. You can just tell me that you see nothing. But if you do 
see something, tell me the name of the thing that you see. Your job is to get as many of 
these right as you can. Are you ready?” The experimenter then presented the 10 images, 
one at a time, for 2 seconds each, and recorded what objects, if any, the children named. 
Upon completion of this task, participants were debriefed and given a small toy for their 
participation. 
SCORING 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
Children’s responses to the 10 items were summed to create a single intolerance 
of uncertainty score (the two statements that reflected a tolerance of uncertainty were 
reverse-scored). Possible total scores ranged from 0 to 40, with lower scores reflecting 
more tolerance of uncertainty and higher scores reflecting more intolerance of 
uncertainty. 
Object Detection Task 
The dependent measure was the total number of objects that participants named in 
the object detection task. 
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Results of Study 1 
INTOLERANCE OF UNCERTAINTY SCALE 
Chronbach’s alpha for the 10 items was .40, which indicated poor interrelatedness 
between the items (see Table 1 for intercorrelations among items). Deleting items from 
the scale did not result in improved reliability. Thus, this measure was not used in 
subsequent analyses for Study 1.  
MANIPULATION CHECK  
To assess whether children’s perceived control, predictability, and affect 
depended on the version of Plinko that they played, independent-samples t-tests were 
conducted on responses to the post-Plinko questions.  Results indicated that children in 
the high-control condition (M = 2.65, SD = .98) perceived themselves as having 
significantly more control over the game than children in the low-control condition,      
(M = 1.31, SD = 1.10), t(50), = 4.79, p < .001. When asked to predict their potential 
success on the next round of the game, children in the high-control condition (M = 2.88, 
SD = .65) predicted significantly more success than children in the low-control condition 
(M = 1.54, SD = .65), t(50) = 7.47, p < .001. The difference in negative affect between 
the conditions was not significant, t(50) = 1.11, p > .20. Children rarely reported being 
upset after playing the game, regardless of whether they were in the low-control 
condition (M = .54, SD = .91) or the high-control condition (M = .31, SD = .55).  Age was 
significantly negatively correlated with children’s predicted success, r = -.33, p < .05, 
indicating that younger children were more likely to predict success on a hypothetical 
next round of the game compared to older children. 
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OBJECT DETECTION TASK 
Due to the low reliability of the intolerance of uncertainty scale, children’s total 
intolerance of uncertainty score was not used as predictor of performance on the object 
detection task. Correlations between each of the items on the intolerance of uncertainty 
scale and the total number of objects detected indicated a significant positive relationship 
for only item 4 of the intolerance of uncertainty scale (“I like going to new places where I 
don’t know what’s going to happen.”), r = 28, p < .05.  
Multiple regression analysis was used to examine whether children’s tendencies 
to detect objects varied by age, gender, and condition (age was entered as a continuous 
variable, while gender and condition were dummy coded). Results indicated that 
responses did not vary as a function of age, gender, or condition, F(3, 48) = .905, p > .20. 
On average, children in the low-control condition detected 5.65 objects (SD = 2.40), and 
children in the high-control condition detected an average of 4.73 objects (SD = 2.84). 
Females detected an average of 5.21 objects (SD = 2.80), and males detected an average 
of 5.17 objects (SD = 2.51). Age was also converted to a categorical variable with 6- and 
7-year-olds in one group (n = 14), 8- and 9-year-olds in a second group (n = 18), and 10-, 
11-, and 12-year-olds in a third group (n = 20). A one-way ANOVA did not reveal any 
age differences in performance on the object detection task, F(2, 49) = 1.15, p > .20. 
Figure 1 depicts the number of objects detected as a function of participant age (treated as 
a continuous variable). 
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Discussion of Study 1 
Study 1 had two primary goals: 1) to test the efficacy of a new personal control 
manipulation for children, and 2) to observe its effects on the detection of patterns. As 
measured by the questions following the game, Plinko did successfully manipulate 
participants’ sense of control and predictability, at least within the context of the game. 
Interestingly, the high-control and low-control conditions did not differ in negative affect. 
According to theory of compensatory control (Kay et al. 2009), it is the negative affect, 
specifically anxiety, that results from a lack of personal control that motivates adults to 
seek compensatory sources of control. To the extent that our negative affect question 
captured anxiety, this may be why condition had no effect on children’s inclination to 
detect patterns in random noise. That is, although children recognized a lack of control, 
they were not made anxious by it, and thus felt no need to compensate. Another 
possibility is that children’s perceptions of lack of control in the game did not affect their 
sense of personal control about events more generally; this issue is further discussed in 
the general discussion.  
It was predicted that children’s intolerance of uncertainty would also be 
associated with their inclination to detect patterns in random noise. However, due to the 
lack of reliability of the intolerance of uncertainty scale, this relationship could not be 
adequately assessed. There are a couple of potential explanations for why children’s 
patterns of responses were inconsistent across the items on the scale. One possible 
explanation for the low reliability of the scale was that not all children completed the 
study in the same environment. Fifteen percent of participants were tested at a 
recreational center in the presence of many distractions (most notably all the other 
children playing), whereas other participants completed the study in a quiet room with 
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only the experimenter present. To eliminate this potential confound, all participants in 
Study 2 completed the experiment at the Children’s Research Lab. 
Another possible explanation for the poor reliability of the scale is the age of the 
participants. The original Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale for Children (Comer et al., 
2009), was found to be reliable for children between the ages of 7 and 17, but the current 
study did include some 6-year olds. Comer et al. (2009) also found that younger children 
reported less tolerance of uncertainty, however, the researchers cautioned that this age 
difference might have been the result of younger children interpreting the items 
differently than older children. In the current study, over half of the sample was 8 years 
old or younger compared to only 20% of the sample used by Comer et al. If it is the case 
that younger children interpreted the items differently than older children, this may have 
resulted in inconsistent patterns of responding for a substantial percentage of the current 
sample, thus affecting the overall measure of reliability.  
Age was also negatively correlated with the amount of success that children 
predicted they would have if they were to play Plinko again. This correlation was mainly 
due to the performance of the 6- and 7-year-olds; when examining only the children who 
were older than 8 years, the relation between age and predicted success was no longer 
significant. Other research has also found that children younger than 8 years predict more 
success on games of chance than do older children (Weisz, 1980). Given this age-related 
finding and the possibility that the youngest children in the sample were answering 
inconsistently on the intolerance of uncertainty scale, Study 2 aimed to recruit more 
participants from the upper-end of the age distribution, and 6-year-olds were not 
included. 
Previous research has suggested that pattern perception may be the most basic 
instantiation of compensatory control, at least in adults (Kay et al., 2009). However, 
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children’s perceived lack of control did not predict the extent to which they detected 
patterns in random noise. As mentioned previously, one possibility is that children did 
not feel threatened by their lack of control and thus did not feel the need to compensate. 
However, children’s responses did vary greatly on this task, with some children detecting 
an object in every image, and other children only reporting objects for the two images in 
which a shape was actually embedded.  It is possible that children interpreted the 
instructions of the task differently (both from other children and from adults), with some 
realizing that incorrect responses were possible, and others viewing the task more 
subjectively. To further examine the effects of lack of control on children’s compensatory 
control-seeking behavior, Study 2 included multiple dependent measures. 
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Method of Study 2 
PARTICIPANTS 
Fifty-four children between the ages of 7 and 12 years participated in Study 2; 
however, two children were excluded due to inattentiveness. Of the 52 participants 
included for analysis, there were 7 7-year-olds (M = 91.63 months), 7 8-year-olds (M = 
103.88 months), 14 9-year-olds (M = 115.17 months), 12 10-year-olds (M = 127.40 
months), 3 11-year-olds (M = 140.6 months), and 9 12-year-olds (M = 151.32 months). 
Thirty-five participants were male, and 17 participants were female. Sixty-one percent of 
the participants were Caucasian, 17% were Hispanic or Latino, 15% were Asian, and 6% 
were more than one race. All participants were recruited from the Children’s Research 
Laboratory. 
MATERIALS 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
The same scale from Study 1 was used in Study 2 to measure individual 
differences in intolerance of uncertainty (see Appendix A). 
Plinko Computer Game 
The same game from Study 1 was used in Study 2 to create a high-control 
condition and a low-control condition.  
Story Task 
This task included six vignettes. Each vignette described a character who 
performed some action (e.g., spinning around in a circle), and each vignette ended with a 
focal event (e.g., winning a lottery contest). All of the vignettes were read aloud and were 
accompanied by a photograph of a child obtained from Google images. After listening to 
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each vignette, participants rated how much they thought the event was caused by the 
actor’s action, using a 5-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “all the way” (e.g., “How 
much do you think that happened because she spun around in a circle?”). Of the six 
vignettes, two included the performance (or lack of performance) of superstitious or 
ritualistic behaviors (one positive outcome and one negative outcome), two vignettes 
involved to the use (or lack of use) of a lucky object (one positive outcome and one 
negative outcome) and two pertained to karma-like beliefs (one positive outcome and one 
negative outcome). The order of presentation was randomized for each participant (see 
Appendix E for all vignettes). 
Explicit Belief Task 
Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement with three statements that 
assessed belief in supernatural sources of control -- God, lucky charms, and karma -- 
using a 5-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “all the way.”  The statements were as 
follows: “Things happen in the world because God makes them happen,” “Lucky charms 
make good things happen,” and “Good things happen to good people and bad things 
happen to bad people” (see Appendix F).  The order of the statements was 
counterbalanced. 
PROCEDURE 
As in Study 1, participants were seen on an individual basis. Upon obtainment of 
informed consent and assent, participants sat at a table, and the researcher outlined the 
tasks of the experiment. Children were shown the 5-point scale and instructed on how to 
use the scale to indicate their responses. The first part of Study 2 was identical to Study 1. 
Participants first answered the practice items and then rated their agreement with the 
items from the intolerance of uncertainty scale. Next, children played the version of 
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Plinko to which they had been randomly assigned (high or low control), and then they 
answered the manipulation check questions. 
The order of the dependent measures was counterbalanced, such that half of the 
participants first completed the story task followed by the explicit belief task, while the 
other half of participants first completed the explicit belief task followed by the story 
task. The experimenter introduced the story task by saying, “Okay, now I am going to tell 
you about six kids and some things that happened to them. After I tell you about each 
one, I am going to ask you a question about what you think happened.” Then the 
experimenter read the six vignettes, one at a time, and participants rated, using the 5-
point scale, how much they thought the event was caused by the action of the character. 
When introducing the explicit belief task, the experimenter said, “Okay now I’m going to 
read you some more sentences, and I want you to tell me how much you agree with 
them.” After the participants heard each statement, they used the 5-point scale to indicate 
their level of agreement. Once children completed both the story task and the explicit 
belief task, they were debriefed and given a small toy for their participation. 
SCORING 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
Children’s responses to the 10 items were summed to create a single intolerance 
of uncertainty score (the two statements that reflected a tolerance of uncertainty were 
reverse-scored). Possible total scores ranged from 0 to 40, with lower scores reflecting 
more tolerance of uncertainty and higher scores reflecting more intolerance of 
uncertainty. 
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Story Task 
For each of the six vignettes, children rated how much they thought the event was 
caused by the character’s action, using a 5-point scale. For each type of vignette 
(superstition, luck, karma), the responses for the two vignettes (positive outcome and 
negative outcome) were summed. Responses to all of the vignettes were summed to 
assess the overall extent to which participants perceived a causal relationship between the 
events and the characters’ actions. For each story type, scores ranged from 0 to 8, and 
overall scores ranged from 0 to 24, with lower scores indicating weaker causal 
relationships and higher scores indicating stronger causal relationships.   
Explicit Belief Task 
Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement with each of the three 
statements of explicit belief (God, luck, karma) using a 5-pont scale ranging from “not at 
all” to “all the way.” Responses to these questions were summed to assess overall belief 
in supernatural sources of control. Possible scores ranged from 0 to 12, with lower scores 
indicating less belief and higher scores indicating more belief. 
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Results of Study 2 
INTOLERANCE OF UNCERTAINTY SCALE 
The Chronbach’s alpha for the 10 items was .68, which indicated satisfactory 
internal consistency of the scale (see Table 2 for intercorrelations among items). While 
there was no overall relationship between participants’ age and intolerance of uncertainty, 
age was significantly correlated with a few of the items on the scale. Specifically, age 
was positively correlated with item 7 (“I always think ahead so that I don’t get 
surprised”), r = .32, p < .05; age was negatively correlated with item 8 (“I wish we could 
always know what’s going to happen in the future”), r = -.33, p < .05, and age was 
positively correlated with item 9 (“Other kids are usually more sure about things than I 
am”), r = .33, p < .05. Figure 2 displays scores on the intolerance of uncertainty scale as a 
function of participant age. Age was also converted to a categorical variable to explore 
potential age differences. The youngest group consisted of 7- and 8-year-olds (n = 14), 
the middle-aged group consisted of 9- and 10-year-olds (n = 26), and the oldest group 
consisted of 11- and 12-year-olds (n = 12). A one-way ANOVA indicated no significant 
effect of age group on intolerance of uncertainty score, F(2, 49) = 1.61, p > .20. 
An independent-samples t-test revealed a marginally significant difference 
between males (M = 20.26, SD = 6.84) and females (M = 16.65, SD = 5.38) in their 
intolerance of uncertainty, t(50) = 1.90, p = .06. Intolerance of uncertainty scores did not 
differ by condition (t(50) = .80, n.s.); the average score for participants in the low-control 
condition was 18.32 (SD = 6.89), while the average score for participants in the high-
control condition was 19.78 (SD = 6.33). 
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MANIPULATION CHECK  
Similar to the results of Study 1, children in the high-control condition (M = 2.52, 
SD = .94) perceived themselves as having significantly more control over the game than 
children in the low-control condition, (M = 1.20, SD = .71), t(50), = 5.70, p < .001. When 
asked to predict their potential success on the next round of the game, children in the 
high-control condition (M = 2.78, SD = .43) predicted significantly more success than 
children in the low-control condition (M = 1.48, SD = .59), t(50) = 9.01, p < .001. The 
difference in negative affect between the conditions was marginally significant, t(50) = 
1.88, p = .07. Children in the low-control condition (M = .44, SD = .71) reported being 
slightly more upset than children in the high-control condition (M = .15, SD = .36), 
although the means for both conditions were quite low. Age was not significantly 
correlated with any of the manipulation check questions (i.e., perceived control, predicted 
success, or negative affect). 
STORY TASK 
Multiple regression analysis was used to examine whether participants’ responses 
to the vignettes varied by age, gender, intolerance of uncertainty, condition (high control 
or low control), and the order of the two dependent measures (story task first or explicit 
belief task first). In the first model, the aforementioned variables were entered as 
predictors of the sum of the participants’ responses for all six vignettes (age and 
intolerance of uncertainty were entered as continuous variables, while gender, condition, 
and order were dummy coded). Results indicated no significant predictors, thus separate 
analyses were conducted for each story type separately (i.e., superstition, karma, and 
luck). For both the superstitious stories and the luck stories, there were no significant 
predictors; however, children overall endorsed the explanations for the luck stories (M = 
2.27, SD = 1.92) significantly more than they did the explanations for the superstitious 
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stories (M = 1.25, SD = 1.69), t(51) = 4.09, p < .001 (see Figure 3 for endorsement as a 
function of story type and condition).  
For the karma stories, results indicated that both age (β = -.35,  p < .01) and 
condition (β = -.30, p < .05) were significant predictors. A forward-selection stepwise 
regression resulted in a model with only age as a significant predictor (β = -.37, p < .01), 
R2 = .14, F(1,50) = 7.89, p < .01; condition was excluded due to marginal significance   
(β = -.25, p = .06). With both age and condition entered into a model, the two variables 
accounted for 18% of the variance in children’s responses to the karma stories, F(2, 49) = 
5.99, p < .01.  Comparison of the AICs for the one-predictor and two-predictor models 
revealed a slightly lower AIC for the model with both age and condition compared to the 
model with only age (4.62 and 4.78, respectively). 
A 2 (condition: high control, low control) x 3 (age group: youngest, middle, 
oldest) ANOVA confirmed a significant main effect of condition, F(1,46) = 4.16, p < .05, 
and a significant main effect of age group , F(2, 46) = 4.73, p < .01, on endorsement of 
explanations in the karma stories (see Figure 4). With regard to condition, children in the 
low-control condition (M = 3.16, SD = 3.53) endorsed the karma explanations 
significantly more than did children in the high-control condition (M = 1.89, SD = 1.99), 
t(50) = 2.02, p < .05. With regard to age, post hoc tests using Bonferroni correction 
indicated that the youngest group (M = 3.93, SD = 3.01) endorsed karma explanations 
marginally more than the middle-aged group (M = 2.19, SD = 1.94), p = .06, and 
significantly more than the oldest group (M = 1.50, SD = 1.24), p < .01. Endorsement of 
karma explanations did not differ significantly between the middle-aged-group and the 
oldest group, p > .20. Treating age as a categorical variable did not reveal any significant 
effects of age on the endorsement of the luck stories, the superstition stories, or the 
endorsement of all story types combined (all ps > .20). 
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EXPLICIT BELIEF TASK 
Multiple regression analysis was used to examine whether participants’ responses 
to the explicit belief questions varied by age, gender, intolerance of uncertainty, condition 
(high control or low control), and order of the dependent measures (story task first or 
explicit belief task first). In the first model, the aforementioned variables were entered as 
predictors of the sum of the participants’ responses for the 3 explicit belief questions (age 
and intolerance of uncertainty were entered as continuous variables; gender, condition, 
and order were dummy coded). Results indicated that the order in which participants 
received the dependent measures affected their responses to the explicit belief questions 
as a whole, F(5, 46), = 2.32, p <.10, R2 = .20. When all variables were entered in the 
model, the order of the dependent measures was the only significant predictor (β = -.37,  
p = .01). Post-hoc analyses revealed that the effect of order was present only for the 
explicit belief question pertaining to luck. Specifically, children who received the luck 
story task first were significantly more likely to report belief in the efficacy of lucky 
charms compared to children who first answered the explicit belief question about lucky 
charms, t(49) = 2.56, p = .01. No other variables emerged as significant predictors of 
children’s responses to the explicit-belief questions about either luck or karma.  Treating 
age as a categorical variable did not reveal any age differences in children’s responses to 
the three explicit belief questions (ps > .20). 
For the explicit-belief question about God’s causal role in the world, intolerance 
of uncertainty emerged as the sole significant predictor (β = .31, p < .05). A forward-
selection stepwise regression resulted in a model with only intolerance of uncertainty as a 
significant predictor (β = .32, p < .05), R2 = .11, F(1,50) = 5.88, p < .05. Intolerance of 
uncertainty was significantly correlated with responses to the explicit-belief question 
about God, r = .34, p < .05 (see Figure 5). 
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Discussion of Study 2 
One goal of Study 2 was to re-examine the reliability of a new measure of 
children’s intolerance of uncertainty.  Compared to Study 1, children’s responses to the 
items on the intolerance of uncertainty scale in Study 2 were more intercorrelated, 
allowing this scale to serve as a reliable measure of individual differences in children’s 
willingness to tolerate uncertainty. One possible explanation for the difference in 
reliability between the studies is the distribution of ages. Although the samples from 
Study 1 and Study 2 had comparable mean ages (9.38 and 9.94, respectively), nearly 50% 
of participants in Study 1 were 8 years old or younger compared to only 27% of 
participants in Study 2. As mentioned in the previous discussion, the youngest children in 
Study 1 may have had trouble interpreting some of the items, (e.g., those that were 
reverse scored), which resulted in inconsistent patterns of responding across the items. 
Combining the participants from the two studies and computing Chronbach’s alpha for 
each age group (6-, 7- and 8-year-olds, 9- and 10-year-olds, and 11- and 12-year-olds) 
supports this explanation. Specifically, these analyses indicate an increase in alpha 
between each of the age groups (.49, .60, .63, respectively). Because Comer et al. (2009) 
cautioned that their obtained age differences in intolerance of uncertainty scores may 
have be the result of age differences in interpretation of the items, the current studies 
modified items from those developed by Comer et al. with the aim of reducing difficulty 
in interpretation (e.g., “Not knowing what will happen in the future makes me uneasy, 
anxious, or stressed” was changed to “I worry a lot about what’s going to happen in the 
future”). However, the youngest children in Study 1 may still have misinterpreted some 
of the items, thus, including less of them in Study 2 may have improved the reliability of 
the scale.  
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It could also be the case that increased consistency in response patterns with age 
reflects something about the development of a general intolerance of uncertainty, with 
older children exhibiting this trait in a variety of contexts and younger children’s 
intolerance of uncertainty being more context-specific. Future research should investigate 
when in development this trait emerges and the extent to which it is related to other 
dispositional traits, such as infant temperament or adult personality. The current study did 
not find any age differences in overall intolerance of uncertainty scores; however, more 
research is needed to determine whether this is a stable individual difference. The current 
study also found a marginal gender difference in intolerance of uncertainty, with males 
reporting less tolerance than females. It is difficult to interpret the implications of this 
finding, given that males were overrepresented in the sample, and gender differences in 
intolerance of uncertainty have not been found in previous studies with children (Comer 
et al., 2009) or adults (Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006). 
One hypothesis of Study 2 was that individual differences in intolerance of 
uncertainty would predict children’s compensatory control-seeking behavior as measured 
by 1) their endorsement of supernatural explanations, and 2) their agreement with explicit 
belief in supernatural sources of control. While there was no effect of intolerance of 
uncertainty on endorsement of explanations in the story task, there was a significant 
relationship between children’s intolerance of uncertainty scores and their explicit belief 
in God as a casual agent. Previous research with adults has found a similar relationship 
between uncertainty tolerance and belief in God (e.g., Valdesolo and Graham, 2013); 
however, this is the first study to date that documents this relationship in children. 
Potential implications of this finding are saved for the general discussion. 
A second prediction for Study 2 was that children who were primed to experience 
a lack of control would be more inclined to seek compensatory control with the 
 42 
endorsement of supernatural explanations and explicit beliefs. Results indicated that 
Plinko did successfully manipulate children’s perceived control and predictability, and 
that this manipulation had a significant effect on children’s endorsement of karma-like 
explanations for positive and negative events. It is worth noting that the difference in 
negative affect between the high-control and low-control conditions was marginally 
significant. This lends support to the notion that anxiety due to lack of control is the 
mechanism by which we are motivated to find sources of compensatory control in order 
to regain a sense of order and predictability (Kay et al., 2009).  
However, lack of control and subsequent negative affect did not increase 
children’s willingness to endorse explanations pertaining to ritualistic behaviors or the 
efficacy of lucky charms. One possible explanation for the differences across story types 
is that both ritualistic behaviors, such as knocking three times before entering the library, 
and the use of lucky charms, such as a special pair of socks, are often person-specific. In 
contrast, a belief in karma, or the idea that what goes around comes around, is applicable 
to everyone. However, it is unclear why priming adults with a lack of control leads to 
increased endorsement of explanations pertaining to other people’s superstitious 
behaviors (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Perhaps children have less personal experience 
with the use of routine rituals compared to teenagers and adults, and as they hear more 
testimony about the efficacy of these behaviors, they become increasingly willing to 
perform them when their personal control is threatened.  
Although condition did not affect responses to the superstitious and luck stories, 
children of all ages were more likely to endorse the explanations in the luck stories than 
those in the superstitious stories. Interestingly, many children who agreed that the events 
in the luck stories were caused by the presence or absence of the lucky charm explained 
their agreement with natural processes. That is, very few children actually thought that 
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there were “magical powers or something” in the charms; rather, most children 
maintained that these objects led to positive outcomes via the “confidence,” 
“motivation,” “focus,” and “effort” that they instilled in their owners. Similarly, children 
explained that the negative outcomes were due to the owner’s rumination about the 
absence of the lucky charm, and that these thoughts led to “no confidence,” “worrying 
too much,” and “not enough brain power.” It is not all that surprising that children this 
age are skeptical of magical causation (Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 
2000); nonetheless, their ability to explain the cognitive consequences of other people’s 
belief in lucky charms was striking. Other research has similarly found that children 
prefer natural over supernatural explanations (e.g., Legare & Gelman, 2008; Woolley et 
al., 2011). 
It is also interesting that the order in which children received the dependent 
measures affected their responses to the explicit belief question about lucky charms. 
Children who first heard the explicit belief question about lucky charms were less likely 
to agree with this question compared to children who first heard the stories about a lucky 
charm causing a positive event (and the absence of a lucky charm causing a negative 
event). That is, children who had already explained that confidence is the mechanism by 
which lucky charms work were more likely to agree with the statement, “lucky charms 
make good things happen.” 
The only instance in which age had an effect was on the endorsement of the 
karma stories, with younger children more likely to agree with karma-like explanations 
than older children. This developmental trajectory was first established by Piaget 
(1932/1965), who described young children as adhering to the belief “that a fault should 
automatically bring about its own punishment” (p. 256). Subsequent research has 
replicated the decline with age in the use of explanations pertaining to immanent justice 
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(Jose, 1991; Suls & Kalle, 1979). Yet, there is evidence that children as old as 12 will 
spontaneously appeal to the valence of a character’s action when explaining positive and 
negative outcomes (Woolley et al., 2011), and even adults have been shown to justify a 
positive or negative event with a person’s deservingness of that event in order to maintain 
a belief that the world is fair, orderly, and predictable (Callan, Ellard, & Nicol, 2006; 
Lerner, 1978; Pepitone & Saffioti, 1997, Raman & Winer, 2004). 
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General Discussion 
A sense of personal control, whether perceived or actual, affords us predictability, 
making us effective agents in a world that is often characterized by uncertainty. Research 
indicates that when adults perceive a threat to their personal control, and experience that 
threat as psychologically aversive, they compensate by seeking other sources of control 
in order to reduce uncertainty and restore order and predictability (Kay et al., 2009). The 
purpose of this dissertation was to explore whether children feel threatened by lack of 
control and uncertainty and whether they seek similar sources of compensatory control as 
adults.  
In the current studies, manipulating children’s ability to make accurate predictions 
affected the extent to which children believed they were in control of the situation. 
However, it is not the lack of control per se that motivates one to seek compensatory 
control, rather one must experience that lack of control as psychologically aversive, and 
thus become motivated to avoid that negative affect by regaining control via some source 
other than the self. In Study 1, there were significant differences between children in the 
low-control condition and those in the high-control condition with regard to perceived 
control and predictability; however, the conditions did not differ in negative affect, nor 
did they differ in their inclination to perceive patterns in random noise. In Study 2, the 
conditions not only differed in perceived control and predictability, but children in the 
low-control condition reported more negative affect than those in the high-control 
condition, and they were more likely to endorse karma-like explanations than children in 
the high-control condition.  
Admittedly, the degree to which children in the low-control condition reported 
negative affect was low; the average score for children in this condition was .44, with “0” 
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corresponding to “not at all” and “1” corresponding to “a little bit.” One limitation to 
using a computer game as a control manipulation is that most children have experienced 
lack of control within the context of games and have learned (either from experience or 
from direct instruction) that such contexts are not worth getting upset about. For example, 
many children explained that they were not upset because “it was just a game” and that 
one “shouldn’t get upset at losing games.” Although some work with adults has used 
computer tasks to prime lack of control (e.g., Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) most studies 
have used either autobiographical recall tasks, in which participants are asked to write a 
detailed account of a time when they experienced either high or low control (e.g., 
Rutjens, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2010; Wang, Whitson, & Menon, 2012), or 
guided imagery tasks, in which participants are asked to imagine frightening situations in 
the context of either high control or low control (e.g., Laurin et al., 2008; Shepherd, Kay, 
Landau, & Keefer, 2011). This type of manipulation links the lack of control to one’s 
personal history and may be perceived as more threatening to one’s overall personal 
control compared to manipulations that take place on a computer and are not specific to 
the individual. Future research could adapt these other methods of control manipulation 
to determine whether children report more anxiety at the thought of personal experiences 
involving lack of control and are thus more inclined to seek compensatory control than 
they were in the current study.  
An alternative explanation is that, although children recognize a lack of personal 
control, this recognition does not result in increased anxiety or motivation to seek 
compensatory control in the same way that it does for adults. For children, other people 
such as parents and teachers are often in control. If children experience a lack of personal 
control in one situation, they may not feel threatened because they still believe that 
someone, somewhere is control of most events. It may not be until adolescence, when 
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individuals are given more independence, that they develop a global sense of personal 
control that can truly be threatened by unpredictable events. More research is needed to 
test these possible explanations. 
Participants’ responses on the intolerance of uncertainty scale suggest that there is 
a great deal of variation in how much children are willing to tolerate uncertainty. Similar 
variation has been found on the adult version of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
(Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). Given that this is one of the 
first studies to measure these individual differences in children, there is much work to be 
done regarding both the development of this trait and its implications. Research with 
adults has focused primarily on how individuals who are less tolerant of uncertainty are 
negatively affected, such as with increased worry (Dugas, Gosseline, & Ladouceur, 
2001), depression (Miranda, Fontes, & Marroquín, 2008), social anxiety (Carleton, 
Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010) or high blood pressure (Greco & Roger, 2003). Since 
the development of the first intolerance of uncertainty scale for children in 2009 by 
Comer et al., research with youth has focused solely on clinical application (e.g., Kertz & 
Woodruff-Borden, 2013; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011; Thibodeau et al., 2015), but it is 
important to assess whether this trait is related to non-clinical developmental outcomes as 
well. For example, educators and psychologists should explore the pedagogical 
implications for children’s intolerance of uncertainty, such as whether it is related to 
decreased confidence in problem-solving, lower self-esteem, or learned helplessness.   
The current study found that one consequence of an intolerance of uncertainty is 
an increased belief in God as a causal agent. This is a noteworthy finding, because the 
role of individual differences in children’s religious cognition has been entirely neglected 
thus far. Existing research focuses on demographic factors, such as family religiosity 
(Wenger, 2001) and religious education (Vaden & Woolley, 2011), or cognitive 
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developmental factors, such as the ability to use testimony (Harris, Pasquini, Duke, 
Asscher, & Pons, 2006) and the development of a theory of mind (Barrett, 2004; Bering 
& Parker, 2006). Of course, this correaltional finding does not permit us to infer that 
intolerance of uncertainty causes one to believe in God; it could be that those who believe 
in God become less tolerant of uncertainty, especially if their god is considered to be all-
knowing and all-powerful. Nonetheless, it is informative to consider individual 
differences alongside demographic and developmental factors when attempting to answer 
the interesting question of why some children are more receptive to the idea of God than 
others. 
Finally, although the current study focused on children’s use of supernatural 
sources of control, compensatory control need not be supernatural. Research indicates 
that adults will also appeal to controlling institutions, like the government, and secular 
beliefs, like belief in progress, to preserve a sense of order. For example, data collected 
from participants in 67 countries demonstrates a negative correlation between perceived 
personal control and preference for governmental control (Kay et al., 2008), and 
experimental evidence indicates that adults who are primed with a lack of control are 
more likely to agree with statements such as, “In two decades, we will live in a better 
world than that of today” (Rutjens et al., 2010). Whether there are similar secular sources 
of control that children may find attractive has yet to be determined. Furthermore, it is 
unclear why, given the same motivation to maintain the belief that the world is not 
random, some people are motivated to find comfort in supernatural sources of control 
while others seek control from natural sources. Hopefully more scientific inquiry can 
address these unanswered questions. 
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Appendix A: Modified Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
1. It really bothers me when I’m not sure about things. How much do you agree 
that it really bothers you when you’re not sure about things? 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
2. I worry a lot about what’s going to happen in the future. How much do you 
agree that you worry a lot about what’s going to happen in the future? 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
3. Sometimes I can’t make up my mind, and that frustrates me.  
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
4. I like going to new places where I don’t know what’s going to happen. [RS] 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
5. I always like to know my plans for the next day. 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
6. It’s okay if I am not sure about things. [RS] 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
7. I always think ahead so that I don’t get surprised. 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
8. I wish we could always know what’s going to happen in the future. 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
9. Other kids are usually more sure about things than I am. 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
10. I get worried when things confuse me. 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
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Appendix B: Plinko Screenshots 
 
      a) player is prompted to guess in    b) player is prompted to select a                                    
          which bin the ball will land        slot from which to drop the ball 
 
 
 
c) player watches the ball travel                         d) player is notified whether guess                                    
down the pegboard         was correct or incorrect 
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Appendix C: Examples of Stimuli Used for Object Detection Task 
 
              Image 1 (no object embedded) 
 
 
           Image 7 (square embedded)  
 52 
Appendix D: Experiment Script for Introduction and Practice Items 
Thanks for agreeing to help me out today! While you’re here, we’re going to do a few 
different things. First, I’m just going to ask you some questions to get to know you. Then, 
I’m going to let you try out a new computer game and you can tell me what you think 
about it.  
For Study 1: And finally, I’m going to show you some pictures and we’ll talk 
about them. Sound good?  
For Study 2: And finally, I’m going to tell you about some kids and some things 
that happened to them, and we’ll talk about that. Sound good? 
 
Okay, so the first thing I’m going to do is read you some sentences, and I want you to tell 
me how much you agree with each one. You can tell me your answer by pointing to one 
of these numbers. (direct attention to laminated number line) 
 
You’ll point to 0 if you do not agree at all with the sentence; point to 1 if you only agree 
a little bit; point to 2 if you agree some; point to 3 if you agree a lot; and point to 4 if you 
agree all the way. 
 
Let’s practice using this number scale for a couple of sentences, okay? Here’s the first 
practice sentence: 
 
I think that vegetables taste better than fruit. Show me how much you agree with 
that sentence. (point to numbers while reading each of the options) Do you not at 
all agree, do you agree a little bit, do you agree some, do you agree a lot, or do 
you agree all the way that vegetables taste better than fruit? 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
  
Okay. The next sentence is: It bothers me when I see someone being mean to their 
little brother. Show me how much you agree with that sentence. 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
The last practice sentence is: I like it when things scare me. Show me how much 
you agree with that. 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
Alright, great! I have a few more sentences for you, and I want you to continue 
pointing to these numbers to show me how much you agree with them. Don’t worry – 
there aren’t any right or wrong answers. Everybody has different ideas, and I just want to 
know what you think. Okay? 
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Appendix E: Story Task 
Superstitious Stories 
Positive Outcome:  
Whenever Carol really wants something, she spins around in a circle and 
counts to 10. The other day, when Carol was at the music store, she saw 
people entering their names for a contest. Carol entered her name in the 
contest, and then she spun around in a circle and counted to 10. A couple 
of days later, the music store called Carol and told her that she was the 
winner of the contest!  
 
How much do you think that happened because she spun around in a circle 
and counted to 10?  
  
 Negative Outcome: 
Whenever Billy goes to the library, he always finds the book that he wants 
to check out. And every time he goes to the library, Billy taps his foot 
three times before he walks inside. The other day, Billy was running late 
and he forgot to tap his foot three times before walking into the library. 
When he went to look for the library book that he really wanted to check 
out, the librarian told him it was already checked out by someone else! 
 
How much do you think that happened because he didn’t tap his foot three 
times before going into the library? 
 
Lucky Charms Stories 
 Positive Outcome: 
Nick likes to play sports with his friends, and he always wears his special 
socks whenever he plays sports. This year, Nick’s friend decided to have a 
birthday party at the bowling alley. Nick was nervous about the party, 
because he didn’t know how to bowl and he didn’t want to be the worst 
bowler there. Nick decided that he would wear his special socks to the 
bowling alley. At the party, he bowled better than all the other kids!  
 
How much do you think that happened because he wore his special socks? 
  
Negative Outcome: 
Sarah is a good student who does well on her tests. Every time that Sarah 
knows she is going to have a test at school, she wears her favorite 
necklace. One day, Sarah went to school and had to take a test, but she 
realized that she had forgotten to wear her favorite necklace! When Sarah 
got her test back, she found out that she got a really bad grade on the test. 
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How much do you think that happened because she forgot to wear her 
favorite necklace?  
Karma Stories 
Positive Outcome: 
Julie likes to help her community, so she volunteers at the animal hospital 
each Wednesday after school. She really enjoys taking care of the animals, 
even when they are sick. One day, when Julie was walking home, she 
found $100 bill on the sidewalk!  
How much do you think that happened because she helped at the animal 
hospital?  
Negative Outcome: 
Stephen thinks it is fun to pick on the other kids in his class and make up 
lies about them. He knows it hurts their feelings, but he does it anyway. 
One day, Stephen made up a lie about someone else in his class and told 
that lie to all the other students. When Stephen was biking home from 
school that day, he got in a bike wreck and broke both of his arms! 
How much do you think that happened because he told the lie at school?
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Table 1: Intercorrelations among Items on the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale in Study 1 
* p < .05
** p < .01 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. It really bothers me when I’m not sure about things. _ 
2. I worry a lot about what’s going to happen in the future. .16 _ 
3. Sometimes I can’t make up my mind, and that frustrates me. .32* .04 _ 
4. I like going to new places where I don’t know what’s going to happen.  -.14 -.14 .10 _ 
5. I always like to know my plans for the next day. -.08 .23 -.10 .28* _ 
6. It’s okay if I’m not sure about things. .02 -.08 .15 .05 -.02 _ 
7. I always think ahead so that I don’t get surprised. -.10 .11 .06 -.04 .17 .08 _ 
8. I wish we could always know what’s going to happen in the future. -.22 .15 -.05 -.17 .17 .04 .12 _ 
9. Other kids are usually more sure about things that I am. -.19 .29* .10 -.13 .08 -.06 -.01 .22 _ 
10. I get worried when things confuse me. .27 .39** .14 -.11 .09 -.02 .01 .01 .16   _   
56 
Table 2: Intercorrelations among Items on the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale in Study 2
* p < .05
** p < .01 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. It really bothers me when I’m not sure about things. _ 
2. I worry a lot about what’s going to happen in the future. .24 _ 
3. Sometimes I can’t make up my mind, and that frustrates me. .23 .15 _ 
4. I like going to new places where I don’t know what’s going to happen.  -.01 .40** .02 _ 
5. I always like to know my plans for the next day. .45** .37** .03 .16 _ 
6. It’s okay if I’m not sure about things. .21 .06 .17 .19 .09 _ 
7. I always think ahead so that I don’t get surprised. .06 .10 .16 -.02 .40** .08 _ 
8. I wish we could always know what’s going to happen in the future. .33* .12 .11 -.04 .46** .13 .29* _ 
9. Other kids are usually more sure about things that I am. .08 .19 .16 -.15 .13 .02 .27 .14 _ 
10. I get worried when things confuse me. .19 .39** .24 .05 .23 .27 .35* .21 .18   _   
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Figure 1: Number of objects detected as a function of age (Study 1) 
 58 
 
Figure 2: Intolerance of uncertainty scores as a function of age (Study 2) 
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Figure 3: Effect of condition on endorsement of explanations in the story task  
 
Participants heard 2 stories of each story type and rated their agreement with the 
explanation on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (all the way). Error bars denote standard 
error of the mean. 
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Figure 4: Main effects of age group and condition on endorsement of explanations for the 
karma stories 
 
Participants heard 2 stories and rated their agreement with the explanation on a scale 
from 0 (not at all) to 4 (all the way). Error bars denote standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 5. Relationship between scores on the intolerance of uncertainty scale and 
agreement with the explicit belief question about God. 
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